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Discovery·fatal if missed

Your expert is about to cut into your own client's property. Opposing counsel sends a list of demands. What do they actually get?

Under the Discovery Act, nothing, until they serve something. The inspection chapter reaches only property "in the possession, custody, or control of any other party to the action" (CCP 2031.010(a)), a party's own investigation of its own client's property is not one of the six discovery methods listed in CCP 2019.010, and the protective order they threaten is unavailable because CCP 2031.060(a) operates only "when an inspection, copying, testing, or sampling ... has been demanded." What they are actually owed comes from four other places: the case management order, their own inspection demand, the expert exchange, and the preservation duty. The trap is that the last one is not a disclosure right at all. It creates no obligation you can satisfy by answering the letter, and it lands at trial rather than on a pretrial motion, which is why the statutory answer and the right answer are not the same.

Last reviewed September 2026 California state court, general civil. Statutory text read at leginfo; no citator was available for this review Report an error How this is verified
Is your own testing a discovery method
No. The Act lists six methods and investigating your own client's property is not among them CCP 2019.010(a) through (f). The nearest method, inspection of documents, things and places, runs against "any other party," CCP 2031.010(a)
Can they get a protective order
Not under section 2031.060. That section is triggered only once an inspection has been demanded, and nobody demanded one CCP 2031.060(a). The terms they want are the ones section 2031.060(b)(4) would impose on a demand, "that the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling be made only on specified terms and conditions"
Who has to disclose a destructive protocol
The demanding party. The only destructive-testing disclosure duty in the Act runs against the party seeking access to someone else's property, not the party testing its own CCP 2031.030(c)(4): a demand shall specify the activity demanded, "the manner in which that activity will be performed, and whether that activity will permanently alter or destroy the item involved"
What they can actually serve
An inspection demand, and it reaches both the dirt and the samples. Entry onto the land to measure, survey, photograph, test or sample it, and separately the physical samples your expert kept CCP 2031.010(d) for the property, 2031.010(c) for tangible things in your client's control; at least 30 days out, 2031.030(c)(2)
When the test data comes out
At the expert exchange, if they demand writings. Not before, and not because they asked nicely in a letter CCP 2034.210(c), 2034.270; the expert's materials again three business days before the deposition, 2034.415
The preservation duty
Already running, and it is not conditional on their letter. Triggered when the party is objectively on notice that litigation is reasonably foreseeable Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Superior Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1133, quoted with approval in City of Gilroy v. Superior Court (Jan. 15, 2026, S282937) slip opn. at p. 35, fn. 15; destruction "in anticipation of a discovery request" is a misuse of discovery, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 12
What the sanction actually is
Usually a jury instruction, not a pretrial order. Issue and evidence sanctions generally require disobedience of an order compelling discovery, and there is no order here New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1428, 1431; CCP 2031.310(i), 2031.320(c); willful suppression inference, Evid. Code 413, CACI No. 204
The cost of stonewalling
Your own expert gets excluded. An unreasonable failure to produce the expert's reports and writings is one of the four grounds CCP 2034.300(c). The exclusion is of "the expert opinion of any witness," on objection by a party who complied
On this page

Your own testing is not a discovery method

The Discovery Act regulates what one party may extract from another. It does not regulate what a party does on its own client's land.

Section 2019.010 is a closed list. A party may obtain discovery by oral and written depositions, interrogatories to a party, inspections of documents, things and places, physical and mental examinations, requests for admissions, and simultaneous exchanges of expert trial witness information. (CCP 2019.010(a) through (f).) Sending your own retained expert to your own client's house with a saw is not on that list. It is investigation, and investigation is what parties do before and alongside discovery, not a form of it.

The section opposing counsel will cite says so on its face. Section 2031.010, subdivision (a) authorizes discovery "by inspecting, copying, testing, or sampling documents, tangible things, land or other property, and electronically stored information in the possession, custody, or control of any other party to the action." Every operative subdivision repeats the structure: a party "may demand that any other party" permit the thing. (CCP 2031.010(b) through (e).) Your client's property is not in the possession of any other party. Nothing in the chapter attaches.

"Any party may obtain discovery ... by inspecting, copying, testing, or sampling documents, tangible things, land or other property, and electronically stored information in the possession, custody, or control of any other party to the action."

CCP 2031.010(a)

The protective order is the same problem one section later. Section 2031.060, subdivision (a) begins: "When an inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of documents, tangible things, places, or electronically stored information has been demanded, the party to whom the demand has been directed, and any other party or affected person, may promptly move for a protective order." The predicate is a demand. A letter is not a demand, a calendar invitation is not a demand, and your own notice of the testing date is not a demand directed at anyone. A motion under section 2031.060 to regulate your testing has no discovery request to attach itself to.

None of which means the court is powerless. It means the power is somewhere else, and the difference matters, because the somewhere else has different standards and a different timetable.

The one place the Act does address destructive testing, and it points the other way

Section 2031.030, subdivision (c)(4) requires that each demand in a set "[s]pecify any inspection, copying, testing, sampling, or related activity that is being demanded, as well as the manner in which that activity will be performed, and whether that activity will permanently alter or destroy the item involved."

That is a destructive-testing disclosure duty, and it is the only one in the chapter. It runs against the party seeking access to someone else's property. So when the defense letter demands a protocol, a methodology, an equipment list and a statement of what will be permanently altered, it is reciting, nearly item for item, the disclosures the statute would require of the defense if the defense served a demand on your client. The letter is a demand-shaped document with no demand in it.

I found no published California decision construing section 2031.030, subdivision (c)(4), which is worth knowing before you build an argument on what it implies in either direction.

The four places their rights actually come from

Take the demand letter apart and every legitimate item in it traces to one of four sources. None of them is the letter.

One, the case management order. This is the real answer in most construction and property cases, and it is the one both sides forget to check before writing letters. A CMO or a stipulated protocol can require notice of testing, a written protocol, an opportunity to attend, split sampling and restoration, and courts do enter them. In Jackson Plaza Homeowners Assn. v. W. Wong Construction Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 16, the special master appointed to regulate pretrial proceedings "ordered that HOA provide all parties with a protocol for its proposed destructive testing" and set a date by which the testing had to be completed. (Id. at p. 20.) That is the mechanism. If your case has a CMO, read it before you answer the letter, because the answer may already be written.

Two, their own inspection demand. Section 2031.010, subdivision (d) lets them demand entry onto your client's property "to inspect and to measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the land or other property, or any designated object or operation on it." Subdivision (c) separately reaches the tangible things your expert collected and kept, because those samples are now in your client's control. They get 30 days' lead time (CCP 2031.030(c)(2)), you respond item by item with compliance, inability or objection (CCP 2031.210(a)(1) through (3)), and if they want to fight an objection they have 45 days to move (CCP 2031.310(c)). This is the procedurally correct route and it is available to them today.

Three, the expert exchange. After the initial trial date is set, a demand for exchange may include "the mutual and simultaneous production for inspection and copying of all discoverable reports and writings, if any, made by any expert ... in the course of preparing that expert's opinion." (CCP 2034.210(c); production under CCP 2034.270.) The field notes, the boring logs, the photographs and the lab data are reports and writings made in the course of preparing the opinion. They come out then. Then the expert produces materials called for by the deposition notice no later than three business days before the deposition. (CCP 2034.415.)

Four, preservation. Which is the subject of the next two sections, and which is not a disclosure right at all.

WHAT THE DISCOVERY ACT COMPELS nothing respond to the demand produce reports and writings litigation foreseeable your test their demand expert exchange trial preservation duty, continuous, owed to nobody's request WHAT RUNS REGARDLESS CACI No. 204, if it was willful The disclosure duties are back-loaded and conditional. The preservation duty is neither.

Preservation, which is not a disclosure right

The strongest paragraph in the letter is the one that asks for nothing. It is also the one you cannot answer by sending a protocol.

Destructive testing is, by definition, a one-way door. The condition your expert opens up is a condition nobody can reconstitute, and the other side's own rights under CCP 2031.010(d) to enter and inspect that condition are extinguished by the act of testing it. That is the real grievance, and it does not depend on any discovery request.

California's duty to preserve does not come from the inspection chapter. The Supreme Court described the shape of it in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, which held there is no tort remedy for the intentional destruction of evidence by a litigating party, and pointed instead to the remedies inside the case. At page 12 the court wrote that "[d]estroying evidence in response to a discovery request after litigation has commenced would surely be a misuse of discovery ... as would such destruction in anticipation of a discovery request." Anticipation is the operative word. The obligation does not wait for the request.

The trigger point was stated more precisely in Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Superior Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1121, where a school district's video system overwrote footage before suit was filed. The court held that the safe harbor in CCP 2023.030(f) does not shield a party whose evidence was lost while the party was under a duty to preserve it, and that "[t]he duty to preserve relevant evidence is triggered when the party is objectively on notice that litigation is reasonably foreseeable, meaning litigation is probable and likely to arise from an incident or dispute and not a mere possibility." (Id. at p. 1133.)

That sentence now carries more weight than the Court of Appeal alone gave it. The Supreme Court quoted it, for the definition of a litigation hold, in City of Gilroy v. Superior Court (Jan. 15, 2026, S282937) slip opn. at p. 35, footnote 15.

Read Victor Valley narrowly all the same. It is an electronically stored information case construing a safe harbor that by its terms applies only to electronically stored information, and the court reached its standard by following federal authority under rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is the best available California statement of when the duty attaches. It is not a holding about soil samples.

What the sanction actually is, and when it lands

The threat in the letter is a protective order. The real exposure is a jury instruction two years later.

Issue, evidence and terminating sanctions under the inspection chapter are keyed to disobedience of a court order. Section 2031.310, subdivision (i) authorizes them "if a party fails to obey an order compelling further response." Section 2031.320, subdivision (c) authorizes them "if a party then fails to obey an order compelling inspection, copying, testing, or sampling." Where there has been no demand, there is no motion to compel, no order, and nothing to disobey.

New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403 is the case that holds the line. A store's surveillance video was overwritten; the trial court imposed evidence and issue sanctions; the Court of Appeal vacated them. "Neither the failure to produce video recordings in response to the first set of inspection demands nor the destruction of the recordings in these circumstances justifies an evidence or issue sanction absent a failure to obey an order compelling discovery." (Id. at p. 1428.) The court read Cedars-Sinai as having suggested, without holding, that the full range of sanctions was available, and declined to treat the suggestion as authority. (Id. at p. 1430.) It also rejected inherent power as a workaround, holding the statutory restrictions binding unless they materially impair the court's ability to ensure the orderly administration of justice. (Id. at p. 1431.)

Then it said where the fight belongs:

"Rather than decide the facts with respect to the intentional destruction of evidence and impose a nonmonetary sanction on a pretrial motion in circumstances not contemplated by the discovery statutes, we believe that in most cases of purported spoliation the facts should be decided and any appropriate inference should be made by the trier of fact after a full hearing at trial."

New Albertsons, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431

And vacating the sanctions changed nothing about the instruction. The court noted that its conclusion "does not preclude an instruction that if the jury finds that Albertsons intentionally destroyed evidence, it may infer that the evidence would have been unfavorable," citing CACI No. 204, and added that the jury could consider "the letter requesting the preservation of evidence." (Id. at p. 1434; see Evid. Code 413.)

That last clause is why the demand letter exists. Opposing counsel is not really expecting a protocol. Counsel is building the exhibit that goes to the jury with the willful suppression instruction, and every unanswered letter in the file improves it.

Whether New Albertsons still states the rule is genuinely unsettled

New Albertsons (2008) says nonmonetary sanctions generally require disobedience of an order compelling discovery. Victor Valley (2023) affirmed evidence and issue sanctions for pre-suit destruction where no such order existed, and did so without discussing New Albertsons at all.

The two are reconcilable on their facts. Victor Valley is an electronically stored information case litigated through the section 2023.030(f) safe harbor, which presupposes that sanctions are on the table and asks only whether the party is excused. New Albertsons asked the prior question, whether the chapter authorizes the sanction at all. They can coexist. But a court reading them together could also conclude that Victor Valley assumed away the point New Albertsons decided.

Treat the question as open, and do not tell a client that a pretrial sanction is unavailable. Tell the client that the cleanest route to one is closed and the messy route is not.

Construction defect cases: the mediation-confidentiality wrinkle

Where the testing happens inside a mediation process, and in construction defect litigation it frequently does, the analysis changes and it changes in the testing party's favor. In Rojas v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 407, a defect case whose case management order extended mediation confidentiality to materials prepared for the mediation, the Court of Appeal had held that raw test data, photographs and witness statements were nonderivative material outside Evid. Code 1119(b). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeal "erred in holding that so-called derivative material 'that is prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation' ... is discoverable 'upon a showing of good cause.'" (Id. at p. 424.)

Two limits before you rely on it. Section 1120, subdivision (a) preserves the discoverability of evidence that was already discoverable outside the mediation, so the physical condition of the property and the samples themselves do not become confidential by being looked at for a mediation. And the protection turns on the writing having been prepared for the mediation, which is a fact about the document, not a label you can apply afterward.

The field notes and photographs, before designation

Not privileged, not absolutely protected, and the argument for withholding them gets weaker the moment the condition stops existing.

A consultant's photographs, boring logs and field notes are at most qualified work product. Section 2018.030, subdivision (a) gives absolute protection only to "[a] writing that reflects an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories." A photograph of a corroded pipe reflects the pipe. Everything else is subdivision (b) material, "not discoverable unless the court determines that denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery in preparing that party's claim or defense or will result in an injustice."

Notice how that standard behaves after destructive testing. The party seeking discovery can no longer see the thing. The only record of the condition at the moment it was opened is the record your expert made. A judge weighing unfair prejudice under subdivision (b) has an unusually easy call, and the fact that you controlled both the destruction and the documentation is not a point in your favor.

So the practical answer on the field record is the opposite of the technical one. You may have a colorable objection until designation. Asserting it, on material that only exists because you destroyed the alternative, is how a discovery position becomes a credibility problem.

Counting the 30 days on their inspection demand A demand must specify a time at least 30 days after service, and the service-method extensions apply on top. Run the dates rather than counting them in your head.

CalCourtDeadlines.com

What to give them anyway, and why

Almost everything on a well-drafted demand letter is something you would volunteer if you were thinking about the trial instead of the letter.

Run each item against one question: does refusing it protect anything real? For most of the list the answer is no, because the information is either already going to come out at the expert exchange or is not worth what refusing it costs.

What they ask forGive itWhy
Locations, depth, number of boringsYesIt is in the expert's report anyway, and it is the fact that makes their attendance meaningful
Methodology, equipment, ASTM standardsYesSame, and a protocol they reviewed in advance is a protocol they cannot attack later
Restoration planYesCosts nothing and answers the only interest they have that is not litigation strategy
Sample preservation and chain of custodyYes, and do itThis is the answer to the spoliation paragraph. Retained split samples are the single best defense to a CACI No. 204 instruction
Attendance by their representative and expertYesRefusing it converts a routine inspection into the centerpiece of a trial narrative
Independent sampling at the same timeYesIt moots their prejudice argument entirely, at no cost to you
Identity and qualifications of everyone attendingQualifications yes, designation noNaming who is on site is fine. Confirming which of them is your testifying expert is the expert exchange's business, CCP 2034.210(a)
The purpose of the testing and its relationship to the claimsIn general termsThe one item that actually asks for your theory of the case. A sentence on what is being investigated is enough; a memorandum on why is not owed

Then say in writing what you are doing and why, and say once that you are doing it voluntarily rather than because section 2031.010 or section 2031.060 requires it. That sentence costs you nothing, and it prevents the accommodation from being cited back at you as a concession that the sections applied. If they want more than you are giving, the answer is the one the statute already provides: serve a demand under section 2031.010, subdivision (d), and everyone will know exactly what the obligations are.

In the construction cases I handle, the case management order usually settles this before anyone writes a letter. Ours typically carry a section requiring notice before a party undertakes destructive testing, and where that section exists it is the whole answer and the statutory argument never comes up. Where it does not, my experience matches what the sections above say: you do not have to give notice, and the court will not make you.

That is not the end of it, though, and this is the part worth internalizing. Testing done without the other side present invites questions later about how it was done, and those questions get asked of your expert on cross rather than in a motion. So if they are not there, document everything, in more detail than feels necessary at the time. The photographs, the logs and the retained samples are what answer the question, and the record you build on the day is the only record that will exist.

What breaks if you get this wrong

Not curable

You test, nobody preserves a sample, and the condition is gone.

There is no order to vacate and no response to amend. The consequence is the willful suppression inference and it is argued to the jury at trial. Evid. Code 413; CACI No. 204; New Albertsons, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1431, 1434.

Not curable

You refuse attendance, then the expert's opinion rests on what only your expert saw.

You have created an evidentiary record that exists in one party's control by that party's choice. Nothing in the Discovery Act fixes this later, and it is the fact pattern the section 2018.030(b) unfair prejudice standard was written for.

Curable, expensively

You withhold the expert's reports and writings at the exchange because you withheld them before.

The court shall exclude the expert opinion of a witness whose party has unreasonably failed to produce reports and writings, on objection by a party who complied. CCP 2034.300(c). The section's own carve-outs are CCP 2034.310 and Articles 4 and 5 (CCP 2034.610 et seq., 2034.710 et seq.), which address augmentation and tardy submission of expert witness information rather than withheld writings, so do not assume one of them fits. You are now litigating your own expert's admissibility.

Curable

You concede in writing that section 2031.060 governs your testing, then try to argue otherwise.

The section requires a demand that was never served. CCP 2031.060(a). A concession in correspondence is not binding, but it is quotable, and you will spend a reply brief on it.

Soft

You answer the letter with the statute and nothing else.

You will be right and it will not help. The letter is an exhibit being assembled for a jury instruction, and a technically correct refusal is the best paragraph in it.

Before the testing date

Eight things, in order

  1. Read the CMO first. If one is in place it may already require notice, a protocol and an opportunity to attend, and it controls over everything in this guide.
  2. Check whether a demand was ever served. If the other side served an inspection demand under CCP 2031.010(d) that is still open, your obligations run through CCP 2031.210 and not through the letter.
  3. Circulate a written protocol with locations, depths, methodology, standards, equipment and restoration, and state that it is provided voluntarily.
  4. Invite attendance in writing and confirm they may take their own photographs and collect their own samples at the same time.
  5. Instruct the expert to retain split samples and to log a chain of custody. This is the item that answers the spoliation paragraph, and it is the one clients and experts skip.
  6. Photograph the condition before, during and after, with dates and locations, on the assumption that this record will be the only one that exists.
  7. Do not concede that CCP 2031.010 or 2031.060 governs testing on your own client's property, and do not invite them to tell you what else they would like considered.
  8. Calendar the expert exchange and treat the field record as producible then. CCP 2034.210(c), 2034.270, 2034.300(c).