The meet and confer letter that is 60 percent right
Audit the letter before you answer it. Check every statute against the device it governs, and every response number against the set you actually served. The most dangerous meet and confer letter is the one that is mostly right, because the correct parts pressure you into conceding the parts that are wrong. A recent cycle in a public-entity nuisance case produced a letter exactly like that, and what follows came out of auditing it line by line before answering.
- Governing framework
- The Civil Discovery Act CCP 2030.010 through 2030.410 for interrogatories, 2031.010 through 2031.320 for inspection demands, sanctions at 2023.010 et seq.
- Interrogatory, cannot answer
- Reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information, with an equally-available carve-out CCP 2030.220(c). No diligent-search affirmation, no custodian identification
- Inspection demand, cannot comply
- Diligent search, a stated reason, and identification of custodians CCP 2031.230. A different device, and a heavier showing
- The clock that ends
- 45 days to move to compel further. Quasi-jurisdictional CCP 2030.300(c), 2031.310(c); Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403
- The clock that does not
- A motion to compel compliance with your own statement of compliance CCP 2031.320; Standon Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 903
Nothing below turns on local practice.
On this page
1. Check which statute they are demanding compliance with
A demand keyed to the wrong statute is demanding relief the Code does not authorize.
The letter demanded that interrogatory responses stating an inability to answer be supplemented "in compliance with" section 2031.230, quoting its diligent-search and lost-or-destroyed language in full. Section 2031.230 governs inspection demands. It has no application to interrogatories. The interrogatory rule is CCP 2030.220(c), which requires a party lacking personal knowledge to say so and to make "a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party."
The differences are not cosmetic. Section 2031.230 requires a diligent-search affirmation, a stated reason for the inability, and identification of custodians. Section 2030.220(c) requires none of that, and it contains an equally-available carve-out that 2031.230 lacks. Supplement under the statute that actually applies, and say so in your response letter.
2. Check their record cites against your actual responses
The same letter identified the deficient responses by number, and the numbers were wrong. The quoted language did not appear in any of the responses cited; it appeared in a different set of responses, with the two plaintiffs transposed.
Before conceding any response is deficient, pull the served set and confirm the quoted language appears where the letter says it does.
Correct the record in writing and invite opposing counsel to identify any response they still contend is deficient. If a motion follows, the separate statement will expose the mismatch anyway. Better that your letter exposed it first.
3. Know which burden is actually yours
Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531 puts the burden of justifying every objection on the responding party, and the letter quoted it for exactly that. True. But it is not the whole picture.
On the 35-interrogatory limit, CCP 2030.040(b) flips the burden: on a protective order motion challenging the number, "the propounding party shall have the burden of justifying the number of these interrogatories." A declaration in the form CCP 2030.050 prescribes does not answer whether the number is warranted under CCP 2030.040(a). Form and substance are different sections.
Note the flip precisely, because it operates only on a protective order motion and only as to the number. Overstate it and you invite a Williams reply.
4. Tax records: relevance is not the test
The letter argued financial records were discoverable because "financial information is discoverable when relevant to the essential issues in the case," citing constitutional privacy cases. Tax returns are different.
California recognizes a privilege against their compelled disclosure, impliedly based on Revenue and Taxation Code section 19282 (Webb v. Standard Oil Co. of California (1957) 49 Cal.2d 509, 513), and it yields only on waiver, a lawsuit whose gravamen is inconsistent with the privilege, or a legislatively declared public policy greater than the confidentiality of returns (Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 721; Weingarten v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 268, 274–275). That third exception is narrow. It applies only where the public policy is one the Legislature has declared.
Relevance to damages does not defeat the tax return privilege.
Produce the property tax bills and assessment records, which are not returns, and hold the return-level documents on a privilege log.
5. Emotional distress: the line moved, and it is not where the letters say it is
Defendants read a complaint alleging emotional distress and demand mental health discovery under Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833. Two corrections.
First, Vinson itself cautioned that a simple claim "would not normally create a controversy regarding the plaintiff's mental state" (id. at p. 840), and the garden variety line runs through Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1015–1018 and Roberts v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330, 337.
Second, do not defend by disclaiming "emotional distress" while claiming "annoyance and discomfort." After Hensley v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1337, annoyance and discomfort damages in nuisance and trespass include emotional distress, so that line no longer exists.
The line that holds is between distress that ensues from the property invasion and a diagnosed, treated, or continuing psychiatric condition placed in issue. Waiver under Evidence Code section 1016 is limited, not complete (In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415, 435–436; Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844).
Draft the verified responses to hold that narrower line. The verified responses, not the adjectives in the complaint, define the claim.
6. Two clocks, and only one of them runs out
The 45-day deadline to move to compel further responses (CCP 2030.300(c), 2031.310(c)) is quasi-jurisdictional (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403).
A motion to compel compliance with your own statement of compliance under CCP 2031.320 has no time limit at all (Standon Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 903). If you think a 1990 case is thin ice, the Court of Appeal repeated it word for word in Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, citing Standon at the same page.
Every "will comply" in your responses is an IOU that never expires. If you promised production and have not produced, that exposure outlives every other issue in the letter. Produce first, argue second.
7. Put confirmations in verified responses, not letters
The letter asked, four separate times, for written confirmation that all responsive information had been provided notwithstanding the objections.
Never give that confirmation in correspondence. Serve it in amended responses under CCP 2030.310(a), and verify them.
Those are two different sections doing two different jobs. CCP 2030.310(a) is what lets you serve an amended answer without leave, for information later discovered, inadvertently omitted, or mistakenly stated. The verification requirement itself is CCP 2030.250. Serve under the first and comply with the second, because an unverified amended response is worth about as much as the letter you were trying to avoid writing.
A letter representation amends nothing and withdraws nothing, but it will be quoted at the hearing. A verified response moots the motion properly.
The audit checklist
- Match every statute cited to the discovery device it governs.
- Pull the served responses and verify every response number the letter attacks.
- Sort the letter's demands into concede, correct, and hold. Concede fast where they are right. Unproduced documents after a statement of compliance is not a fight.
- Identify which burdens are yours and which are theirs, by section.
- Answer every "confirm by letter" request with a verified response instead.
- Calendar both clocks: their 45 days, and your open-ended 2031.320 exposure.
What breaks if you get this wrong
The letter that arrives citing Williams is betting you will not check the rest. Check the rest.
You let their 45 days run while arguing in correspondence
Their window under CCP 2030.300(c) and 2031.310(c) is quasi-jurisdictional (Sexton). That cuts both ways, and it is the one deadline in the exchange that no judge can restore. A letter war that runs past it is the responding party's friend and the propounding party's malpractice.
You said "will comply" and did not produce
CCP 2031.320 carries no time limit (Standon, 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 903). This is the exposure that outlives every other issue in the letter, and it is the one item on the list you should concede immediately rather than brief. Produce first, argue second.
You confirmed completeness in a letter instead of a verified response
A letter amends nothing and withdraws nothing, and it will still be read into the record at the hearing. Serving verified amended responses under CCP 2030.310 fixes it and moots the motion. Doing it before the hearing is the whole point.
You supplemented under the statute they named rather than the one that applies
Answering an interrogatory as though CCP 2031.230 applied hands over a diligent-search affirmation and a custodian list that CCP 2030.220(c) never required, and waives the equally-available carve-out you had. You can serve a corrected response, but you cannot un-give what you already gave.
They cited the wrong response numbers
Correct it in writing and invite them to identify what they still contend is deficient. If a motion follows, the separate statement exposes the mismatch on its own. Nothing is lost by being the one who pointed it out first.